the most prominent contemporary cognitive approaches to the study of false belief is that proposed by Theory of Mind (ToM) researchers (e.g., Sodian & Frith, 1992) , whose definition of false belief includes a variety of phenomena that range from the simple attribution of a ·mental state to another person to the more complex understanding that a person can have mental states about another person's mental states (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000) .
False Belief and Theory of Mind (ToM)
In the language of Theory of Mind, there are five levels in the development of the attribution of informational or mental states to the self and others that range from simple visual perspective-taking to predicting actions on the basis of false belief (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, & Hadwin, 1999) . In the ToM model, Levels 1 to 3 are believed to describe early perspective-taking abilities that develop a basic or first-order understanding of the perceptions or perspectives of another. Levels 4 and 5, collectively referred to as second-order beliefs, describe the more complex attributions of true and false belief and appropriate predictions of actions on this basis.
According to ToM, Level 4 of the model of informational states of the self and others involves the principle that actions can be predicted on the basis of true belief (Howlin et aI., 1999) . Consider a traditional ToM training task involving toys, in which two similar scenes are portrayed. In one scene, a car is placed beside a boat, and in the other scene, an identical car is placed beside a plane. A child is then provided with the following true belief story. "This morning, you saw the car next to the boat but you did not see the car next to the plane." The child is then asked, "Where do you think the car is? Why do you think it is near the boat? Where will you go to get the car? Why will you go to the boat?" The correct conclusions regarding this scenario require the knowledge that one will only know what one has seen (i.e., a true belief), and that one will act on this basis.
Level 5 of this model involves the principle that one can predict actions on the basis of false belief and can become aware that previous beliefs may have been false (Howlin et aI. , 1999) . Cognitive researchers have suggested that this level of understanding requires the development of the mind's representational capacity to the extent that it can become reflexively aware of its own representations (Bennett, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) . Specifically, in instances in which one's representations or beliefs are discriminated as incorrect (e.g., when events occurred without one's knowledge) the individual can alter the belief held about these events and can recognize that prior to acquiring the new information he/ she was behaving on the basis of a false belief.
The Deceptive Container Task is one of the most commonly used procedures for testing and training children's attributions of false informational states (perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989) . A child is shown a Smarties box, for example, and asked, "What do you think is inside the Smarties box?" Unbeknownst to the child, the Smarties box does not contain Smarties, but does in fact contain pencils. The child is then shown inside the Smarties box, and asked, "Before we opened the Smarties box, what did you think was inside? And what is really inside?" Perner et al. (1987) suggested that the cognitive capabilities of children below 4 years of age are not sufficiently developed to handle the representational complexity involved in false belief tasks of this kind. A number of studies have supported this hypothesis. For example, Gopnik and Astington (1988) reported that 3-year-old children overall responded poorly on the Deceptive Container Task. Furthermore, Wimmer and Perner (1983) reported a notable developmental increase in children's abilities to make true and false belief attributions around 4 years of age. However, these researchers have resisted the argument that the development of false belief is merely a side effect of increased memory and central processing capacity, but suggested instead that a novel cognitive skill emerges some time between the ages of 4 and 6 years (see also Mossier, 1976) .
Relational Frame Theory and False Belief
Although perspective-taking and true/false belil3f have traditionally been the domain of cognitive psychology, a group of behavioral psychologists have also recently become interested in these phenomena (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004) . Specifically, these researchers have investigated, and attempted to account for, the development of perspective-taking and related cognitive skills under the rubric of a modern behavioral account of human language and cognition known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT: Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) . Consistent with the functional objectives of a behavioral analysis, RFT researchers have argued that although the ToM account of perspective-taking and true/false belief offers an elaborate description of these abilities, it falls short in terms of identifying the precise behavioral processes involved. Furthermore, therefore, it remains unclear how deIicits in this regard might best be remediated.
According to RFT, the emergence of repertoires of derived relational responding forms the basis of the development of human language and cognition (Hayes et aI. , 2001; Hayes & Hayes, 1992) . From this perspective, repertoires of derived naming or name-object symmetry are among the first relational skills to develop (Lipl<ens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993) . For instance, on hearing the spoken word "doll" emitted by a caregiver, reinforcement may be provided to an infant for orienting in the direction of, or pointing to, the doll. This training episode may be described as 'hear name A, see and point to object B.' On a subsequent interaction, the child may be playing with a doll and on approach the caregiver utters the word "doll." This interaction may be described as 'see object B, hear name A.' Across a range of objects, words, events, and so forth, the child will be explicitly taught in both directions of this name-object relationship (i.e., name A -+ object B; object B -+ name A). Eventually, after receiving a sufficient number of explicit bidirectional traini ng exemplars, the child learns to derive from A to B if given B to A, or vice versa. For example, imagine that the child hears for the first time the name of a novel toy in the presence of that toy (i.e., she learns: see object B -+ hear name B). When asked at a later time 'Where is (name of novel toy)? ' she may orient or point towards the toy without having received explicit training to do so (i.e., she derives: see name A -+ orient / point to object B). According to RFT, an appropriate history of exemplar training will give rise to the development of derived name-object repertoires that exponentially increase the number of bidirectional word-object relations the child is capable of.
On this basis of simple derived symmetry (or mutual entailment), RFT argues that a whole series of complex relational skills develop that permit the emergence of a multitude of derived relations among all manner of stimuli and events. For example, whole relational networks containing stimulus relations of coordination, opposition, and hierarchy develop and one entire relational network can be analogously related to another network (Hayes, Blackledge, & Barnes-Holmes, 2001; Stewart & BarnesHolmes, 2001 ). In the language of RFT, these different relational patterns of coordination and so forth are called relational frames and a number of such families have been identified empirically thus far (Hayes, BarnesHolmes, et aI., 2001; Stewart et aI. , 2001) .
A number of relational frames have already been empirically identified thus far (Dymond & Barnes, 1995 , 1996 Steele & Hayes, 1991 ; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988) . One such family of relational frames that appears to operate at a high level of complexity are the deictic frames that specify stimulus relations in terms of the perspective of the speaker and that appear to playa role in the development of perspective-taking and related cognitive abilities. The three frames that appear to be most important in this regard are those of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2001) . In a recent RFT study of these phenomena, McHugh et al. (2004) employed a protocol for assessing the performances of different age groups on perspective-taking tasks involving the three deictic relational frames .
Consider the following perspective-taking trial-type referred to by McHugh et al. (2004) as a 'simple I-you trial.' During this trial, partiCipants were presented with the following question: "If I (experimenter) have a red brick and you (participant) have a blue brick: Which brick do I have? Which brick do you have?" According to RFT, responding correctly to this trial (i.e., "you/experimenter have a red brick and I/participant have a blue brick") requires that participants respond in accordance with the I-you frame. This task involved the lowest level of complexity of all of the deictic tasks used and thus it is referred to as 'simple.'
The next highest level of complexity after a simple deictic task was a reversed task. The McHugh et al. (2004) protocol contained reversals of the relations from all three perspective-taking frames. Consider the following reversed I-you trial: "If I have a red brick and you have a green brick, and if I was you and you were me: Which brick would you have? Which brick would I have?" In the language of RFT, a correct response to this trial involves a transformation of functions in accordance with a deictic relation between I and you (required by the statement "If I was you and you were me"). More specifically, the mutually entailed relation between I and you transfers "red brick" from I to you and "green brick" from you to I. The protocol also contained trials involving similar reversals of the here-there and now-then relations. Once again, during now-then reversed trials only one perspective was tested in order to avoid the derivation of unspecified relations.
The third and highest level of relational complexity employed by McHugh et al. (2004) involved 'double reversed relations,' in which two types of deictic relations were reversed simultaneously. Consider the following trial: "I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was you and you were me, and if here was there and there was here: Where would you be sitting? Where would I be sitting?" In this trial, the I-you reversal followed by the here-there reversal involves two sets of mutually entailed relations between I and you and between here and there, thus reversing the initially reversed relations. The participant deriving these relations will report that she ends up in the seat in which she originally started.
The findings from the study by McHugh et al. (2004) suggested a developmental trend in the abilities of participants aged from early childhood to adulthood to perform the relational perspective-taking tasks. That is, the youngest participants (aged 3-5 years old) produced more errors on the relational tasks than all of the older participant groups (ranging from 6-30 years old). With regard to relation type, the findings from this study revealed differences between now-then and here-there simple relations; between here-there and I-you reversed relations, and between now-then and I-you reversed relations. These data indicated that responding in accordance with the now-then frame produced the greatest difficulty for the participants in this study. With regard to relational complexity, the data from this study showed differences between simple and reversed trials for all three relation types· (i.e., weaker performances were recorded on I-you simple relations than on I-you reversed trials; on here-there simple than reversed relations; and on now-then simple than reversed relations. This pattern of significant differences indicates that levels of accuracy appeared to decrease as a function of relational complexity. Broadly speaking, participants in the four oldest age groups produced their highest levels of accuracy on I-you relations and their lowest levels of accuracy on now-then relations. Furthermore, participants performed better on simple relations overall than on reversed relations. As well as being consistent with the findings from the previous study conducted by these researchers involving the same protocol, the authors also noted the consistency of these data with the mainstream cognitive literature, which has reported that performances on simple ToM tasks generally develop across the ages of 4 and 5 years old, and are usually well established by age 6 (Taylor, 1988) .
In other words, the researchers argued that the youngest children possessed less sophisticated repertoires of relational perspective-taking because of their inability to derive the reversed and double reversed I-you, here-there, and now-then relations, in particular. Perhaps one of the most interesting features of the McHugh et al. (2004) study was its concordance with findings from the ToM literature, in which early perspective-taking is reported to emerge across the ages of 4 and 5 years old, with more sophisticated abilities becoming well established by age 6 (Taylor, 1988) . This concordance of evidence supported the suggestion made by McHugh et al. that responding in accordance with the three perspective-taking frames may involve similar behavioral processes to those traditionally referred to as ToM. The literature on ToM suggests that an important relationship exists between perspective-taking and false belief (Taylor, 1988) . Specifically, researchers in this area have argued that understanding false belief constitutes a high level of perspective-taking abilities and underpins the most complex level of perspective-taking , namely, deception. With the findings from the experiment reported by McHugh et al. (2004) , it seems plausible, therefore, that false belief from a relational frame perspective may also involve the three perspective-taking frames I-you, here-there, and now-then. Furthermore, from this perspective, an understanding of false belief, as opposed to true belief, would appear to involve additional relational complexity with logical not. Consider the following questions from traditional false belief tasks: "Why did you think there were Smarties in the box before now? and "Why do you think there are pencils there now?" From a RFT perspective, responding correctly to these questions requires the ability to derive relations in accordance with the deictic frames of here-there and now-then, and in accordance with logical not as follows: "I did NOT see inside THERE and THEN, but I do see inside HERE and NOW."
In line with predictions made by Relational Frame Theory, McHugh et al. (2004) employed a protocol that directly targeted the relational frames involved in perspective taking. A similar approach was adopted in the current study with a view to analyzing true and false belief responding. Participants in this study were exposed to an automated protocol of 12 relational tasks, designed to assess the three relational frames of I-you, here-there , now-then , as well as logical not. The 12 tasks were comprised of 6 true belief and 6 false belief tasks. The true belief tasks were based on Level 4 of understanding informational states and the false belief tasks were derived from Level 5 (Howlin et aI., 1999). These latter tasks were similar, therefore, to the traditional deceptive container task but emphasized the relational properties of the perspective-taking frames and logical not.
In developing these tasks, a similar approach to that employed by McHugh et al. (2004) was adopted in order to keep both tasks and instructions as short as possible. Once again, the current experiment was primarily cross-sectional and developmental in nature, involving participants across various age ranges (i.e., from 3 to 30 years old). The results, therefore, provided developmental profiles based on each age group's average performance across the 12 tasks (Experiment 1) and across a range of similar tasks involving novel sets of stimuli (Experiment 2).
EXPERIMENT 1 Method

Participants
Forty participants from five different age ranges participated in Experiment 1. The participants' age bands were as follows: 3 to 5 years (early childhood); 6 to 8 years (middle childhood); 9 to 11 years (late childhood); 12 to 14 years (adolescence); and 18 to 30 years (adulthood). There were 8 participants in each age group. The adolescents and children who participated were selected from volunteers following classroom announcements made in various schools in the area of Dublin, Ireland. These individuals were chosen on the basis that neither their mainstream schoolteachers nor parents had identified them as presenting a learning difficulty. The consent of parents and teachers was obtained prior to each child's participation. All of the adult participants were recruited through faculty board announcements within the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. None of the participants received remuneration for taking part in the experiment.
Setting and Apparatus
With all adult participants, Experiment 1 was conducted in a quiet room free from distraction located in the University. All of the adolescents and children were exposed to the procedure in a similar room located within their respective schools. In all cases the room contained only a desk, a chair, and a personal computer with a 14-inch color monitor and standard computer mouse interface. All aspects of the procedure were automated and thus involved participants interacting directly with a computer. All trial presentations and response recordings were controlled by programs written in Visual Basic, Version 6.0. All participants were exposed to the procedure individually. The participants in four of the five age groups remained alone in the experimental room while the automated procedure was being conducted. This was not possible with the youngest group of participants, with whom the experimenter remained at all times throughout the experiment.
General Procedure
The automated true/false belief protocol that comprised Experiment 1 was presented to all participants as a test and no feedback was provided after any response. All participants were exposed to two tests across 2 consecutive days, availability permitting. Participants took approximately 5 minutes to complete each test exposure, giving an approximate overall experimental time of 10 minutes.
Before the start of the experiment, each participant was made familiar with the necessary computer interactions. For the four oldest groups of participants, this involved the provision of minimal instructions and allowing the participants to practice using the apparatus. For the youngest group, the instructions were more comprehensive and much more practice was required by each child. It was for this reason that the experimenter remained present with these participants throughout the experiment. In the case of participants from the other four groups, they were informed that the experimenter would remain outside the room at all times and they were assured that her attention could be sought at any time if necessary. Prior to the commencement of the automated program, participants were provided with a brief set of instructions as follows:
Each computer screen presents a task. Your job is to observe each task and listen to the instructions through the headset and then work out what you think is the correct answer to each question. You must make the correct choices from those made available to you on the screen. You should use the mouse to click on the picture that you think is the correct choice on each task. The computer will then present the next task immediately. Please attend carefully to each task and do your best at all times. The computer will let you know when the experiment is over.
For all groups other than the 3-to 5-year-olds, at this point in the procedure, the experimenter instigated the automated program and left the experimental room. 
Description of Protocol
The protocol presented in Experiment 1 consisted of two blocks of 12 test trials designed to assess participants' performances on a range of specific true and false belief tasks. The 12 trials involved two exposures to each of six tasks denoted as follows: here; there; not here; not there; before now; and after now. These six tasks are presented in Table 1 .
The automated protocol consisted of 12 trials with two exposures to each of the six tasks. The six tasks differed from each other in terms of the relational frame (or frames) that were bein!~ targeted directly. For illustrative purposes, consider first what is referred to as the here task. During this task, two pictures-one of a plate of cookies and the other of a doll-were presented along with the following verbal stimuli here labeled L 1, L2, and L3 for ease of communication: [L 1] "11' you put the doll in the cookie jar and I am here"-[L2] "What would I think is in the cookie jar?"-[L3] "What would you think is in the cookie jar?" In the case of both L2 and L3, the participant was given the option of either 'Doll' or 'Cookies.' L 1 suggests that both the experimenter (I) and the participant (you) are here (i.e., at the cookie jar). The correct response to the questions in both L2 and L3, therefore, is the option 'Doll,' based on the information, provided by L 1, that both the experimenter and the! participant are located here and will therefore know what is inside. Specifically, a correct response in this trial involves the participant indicating that I (experimenter) will think that inside the cookie jar is a doll, and you (participant) will think the same (because we were both here when you put the doll in the cookie jar).
For illustrative purposes a diagrammatic representation of the derived relations involved in responding to a here task is presented in Figure 1 . According to RFT, in this task a relation of coordination exists between here and I because I am the protagonist in the situation here (and from my perspective, this is where I am located). A deictic relation also exists between I and you because the words I and you are cues for specific differential perspective-taking responses. You is also coordinate with here because the task explicitly specifies this relation. Furthermore, because you and I are coordinate with the same place (i.e., here) and because you and I are in a deictic relation, then there is a transfer of knowledge functions (doll in cookie jar) from I to you.
Each block of 12 test trials contained two exposures to the here trialtype. Although both exposures were very similar in form, there were subtle differences with regard to the actions of I and you contained within the instructional statement. That is, in one of the here trials the participant was instructed as follows: "If you put the doll in the cookie jar and I am here." In this trial the scenario depicted involves you (participant) placing the doll in the jar and I (experimenter) being present here. In the other here trial, the locations of I and you were reversed. In these trials, the participant was instructed: "If I put the doll in the cookie jar and you are here" in which I (experimenter) am placing (hypothetically speaking) the doll in the jar and you (participant) are here. Although the correct responses to the questions are the same on both trials, each statement requires I will know that there is a doll in the cooki e jar because I was here VYhen itwas put inside. You wi ll knOYVthat there is a doll in the cooJ.ae jar because yo u were here when the doll 'WaS putinside. Figure 1 . A diagrammatic representation of the derived relations involved in a HERE task.
YOU
that the participant adopt a different perspective. In the first example (i.e., "If you put the doll in the cookie jar and I am here"), the participant must correctly discriminate the perspective of the experimenter who will know what is inside because she or he is present (here). In the second example (i.e., "If I put the doll in the cookie jar and you are here"), the participant must discriminate his/her own perspective (I am here so I know what is inside) . In this way, one of the here trials might be referred to as involving the perspective of the self, while the other trial might be referred to as involving the perspective of the other. Each test block, therefore, contained one exposure to each of these trials. Both trials were followed by the same two questions and correct responses to both questions were required in order for the trial to be recorded as correct. However, the order of the questions was also counterbalanced across the two here trials so that the participants could not simply repeat the same answer to both trials. That is, on one of the trials the I question ("What would I think is in the cookie jar?") was presented first and the you question ("What would you think is in the cookie jar?") was presented second. On the other here trial, the order of the questions was reversed . The protocol also contained two exposures to there trials that were identical to here trials, except that the location there was stipulated instead of here (e.g., If you put the doll in the cookie jar and I was there"). All other aspects of the two there trials were identical to the here trials. The here and there trials were employed to assess responding to true belief (ToM Level 4 of informational states) rather than false belief. From a RFT perspective, false belief tasks require the inclusion of logical not and although the here-there tasks in the current study assessed the here-there frame directly they did not incorporate logical not. Hence, these trials were employed to assess responding to true belief in terms of here-there relations, rather than responding to false belief. In this regard, these trials also provided a useful comparison with the false belief trials (see below).
From an RFT perspective, trials involving 10~lical not may be useful in assessing responding to false belief. The false belief trials contained within the current protocol also targeted here-there responding and were referred to as not-here and not-there trial-types. These trials were almost identical to the here and there trials, respectively, with the exception that they involved the addition of logical not. The instructions presented to participants during the not-there trial-type, for example, were as follows: "If I put the doll in the cookie jar and you were not there. What would I think is in the cookie jar? What would you think is in the cookie jar?" When asked whether either person would know what is inside the jar, the correct response in this case involved indicating that I (experimenter) would know what is inside but you (participant) would not know, because you were not located there (i.e., you were not there, so you will not know). Each block of 12 test trials contained two exposures to the not-here trial-type and two exposures to the not-there trial-type. The two not-here and the two notthere trials were identical to the two here and there trials, respectively, except that I and you were counterbalanced in the false belief trials with regard to who was not present (as opposed to who was present in the there and here trials). Once again, the order of the questions was counterbalanced across each pair of trials presented for each trial type. Figure 2 presents a diagrammatic representation of the derived relations involved in responding to a not-here task. In this task there is a relation of coordination between here and I because I am the protagonist in the situation here. There is a deictic relation between I and you because the words I and you are cues for differential perspective-taking responses. There is a relation of distinction between you and here because this is explicitly specified by the task using the not cue. Because you and I are not coordinate with the same place (i.e., here), there is no transfer of knowledge functions (doll in cookie jar) from I to you.
The two remaining trial-types contained within the protocol directly targeted the relational frame of now-then. These trial types were referred to as before-now and after-now, and there were two exposures to each trial type in each block of 12 test trials. The instructions presented to participants during before-now trials , for example , were as follows: "You open the cookie jar and there is a doll inside now. Now what do you think is in the cookie jar? Before now what did you think was in the cookie jar?" That is, on a before-now trial, participants WE3re required to respond in accordance with both now and before now and were again required to answer both questions correctly in order for the response on that trial to be recorded as correct. A correct response on this trial involved the I will know that there is a doll in the coo~e jar as I was here when it was put inside You will not know that there is a doll in th e cookie jar as yo u were not here when it was put inside participant discriminating .her or his own perspective in that she or he would know what is inside the jar now because she or he has seen inside, but that she or he would not know what was inside before now because she or he had not seen inside at that time. Similar to previous trials, one of the before-now trials examined the perspective of the self (i.e., you open the cookie jar and there is a doll inside), while the other beforenow trial examined the perspective of the other (i.e., I open the cookie jar and there is a doll inside). However, unlike the other trial-types, the two questions presented in each trial did not request information about both perspectives. That is, on temporal relations, one can only specify one perspective at a time (i.e., either I or you, but not both) in order to avoid relations becoming unspecified. For example, if presented with the statement "You open the cookie jar and there is a doll inside now" it would make little sense to ask "Now what do I think is in the cookie jar? Because there is not enough information in the statement to derive what I was doing at the time that you opened the jar. Thus, both questions during the before-now and after-now trials concerned the perspective of only the self or the other, but each specified a different temporal relation (e.g., now and before now). Once again, the order of the questions was counterbalanced, and in this case, this involved altering whether the now question appeared first followed by the before-now question or vice versa. The before-now trials were designed to assess false belief. Although they did not explicitly contain logical not, the temporal order of events implied the presence of a false belief. A diagrammatic representation of the derivEld relations involved in responding to a before-now task is presented in Figure 3 . The figure suggests that responding in accordance with temporal relations may be somewhat more complex than responding to other relations because the former appears to require some competence with hierarchical relations. Specifically, phenomena can exist in only one place, but can and do exist in more than one time. For example, you exists both now and before-now, (i.e. , you is coordinate with both times) but at anyone time you can only coordinate with a single place. In the before-now task, a relation of coordination is established between you and now as well as between you and before-now. According to RFT, this is a relation of hierarchy in which you is the connecting node Bind there is a temporal relation between now and before-now because both are coordinate with different instances of the you perspective. You am a protagonist now and therefore you possess knowledge functions now. The temporal relation has unidirectional properties (time 'flows' in one direction) and temporal relations typically involve a un idirectional transfer of knowledge functions -from past (before-now) to present (now) but not from present to past. The knowledge functions attached to you-now will therefore not transfer to you-before now. The after-now trial-type was identical to before-now, except that before was substituted with after. The instructional statement and the now question, therefore, remained the same, but the before-now question was replaced by after-now (i.e., "After now what would you think is in the cookie jar?") The correct response to this question involved indicating that after now a person will know what is inside the cookie jar because she or he has seen inside. There were two after-now trials and these were counterbalanced as before. Although the after-now trials were almost identical to the before-now trials, they assessed an understanding of true rather than false belief. Consider the trial: "You open the cookie jar and there is a doll inside now. Now what do you think is in the cookie jar? After now what would you think was in the cookie jar?" This task assessed true belief because the correct answer required participants to determine that they can act on the basis of what they have seen as true.
Procedure
The automated test procedure commenced with an introductory screen consisting of a blue background with a single gray button featuring the word 'Start' in black letters. The experiment proper commenced when the participant used the mouse to click on this button.
The second screen to appear was an intermediate screen. These screens were presented before each experimental trial and were employed simply to allow the participant to take a short break between trials, if necessary. The intermediate screen consisted of a red background , in the If I put the doll in the cookie jar and you were not here
What would I think is in the cookie .iar?
What would YOU think is in the cookie jar? middle of which was located a dark gray rectangular button box containing the words CLICK TO CONTINUE. When participants clicked this button, the next screen appeared immediately. After clicking on the first intermediate screen, the 1 st of the 12 randomized test trials appeared. For illustrative purposes, an example of one of the test screens (i.e., a here / not-here trial-type) is presented in Figure 4 .
Each test screen initially featured a green background with a line of text presenting the statement for that trial (L 1) located in the upper middle section of the screen. Approximately 0.5 seconds after the screen appeared, a sound file commenced. In the example provided in Figure  4 , the statement (L 1) presented at the top of the screen was as follows: "If I put a doll in the cookie jar and you were not here." As soon as the statement appeared, a prerecorded audio version of the statement (in the experimenter's voice) was presented.
Below the L 1 statement, there were two large gray boxes located in the middle of the screen, one above the other, each box was identical in size and format. The box on top was visibly labeled 'Question l' with the box below labeled 'Question 2.' As each screen first appeared, both question boxes were visible, but only the Question 1 box was active immediately (i.e., Question 1 was clearly visible and partiCipants could click the response buttons for this question whereas Question 2 was shaded and the response buttons could not be activated). This procedure ensured that participants responded to Question 1 before being exposed to Question 2. Only after Question 1 had been responded did Question 2 become active.
Each question box contained a printed question (e.g., "What would I think is in the cookie jar?") and two colored pictures. The two colored pictures were presented below the printed question, one on the left and one on the right. One of the pictures was of cookies, the other was a picture of a doll (see Figure 4) . Each picture was presented in front of a button box, operated by the participant clicking directly on the picture. In order to answer a question, participants were required to click on the picture that represented what they felt to be the correct choice.
The question contained within each box was also presented as an audio recording. Immediately after the audio rElcording containing the statement had played, the sound file for Question 1 was activated and participants were required to click on the picturE! that represented what they felt to be the correct choice before Question 2 became active. That is, given the statement: "If I put a doll in the cookie jar and you are not here," a correct response to the question: "What would I think is in the cookie jar?" involved clicking on the picture of the doll. Before making a choice in response to Question 1, participants had the option of hearing the question repeated. This involved clicking a small gray button box with REPEAT QUESTION written on it, located on the righthand side of the question box (see Figure 4) . The audio recording for the question played automatically when a participant clicked this box with the cursor. Participants could only have the question repeated prior to making a choice. Immediately after selecting a picture in response to Question 1, all aspects of the Question 1 box (including the repeat box) became inactive and the Question 2 box was activated. The procedure for presenting Question 2 was identical to that for the previous question. Once participants had selected one of the choices for Question 2, the trial was complete. At the end of each trial an intermediate screen appeared immediately. Th is remained present until participants clicked to continue, after which the next test trial appeared immediately.
Each of the 12 test screens was followed by an intermediate screen, except for the last one. After the last test screen had been completed, a final THANK YOU screen appeared immediately. This consisted of a red full-size background with a large gray text box in the middle, in which the following message appeared: "Thank you for your participation so far. Please report to the Experimenter." Each participant was given two complete exposures to the automated protocol (i.e., two tests).
Results
In order to minimize errors based on inexperience with the procedure, only responses for the second exposure were analyzed. The accuracy data were then grouped by age category and these are presented in Figure 5 . Figure 5 indicates a developmental trend in terms of the total number of correct responses produced by participants across the five age groups on the relational true/false belief protocol. That is, participants in the youngest age group (3-5 years) appeared to produce the least number of correct responses, whereas participants in the. oldest age group (18-30 years) appeared to produce the largest number correct. Furthermore, the number of correct responses produced by participants between these two age groups appeared to increase as a function of age. The accuracy data were subjected to a statistical analysis using a 5 x 6 mixed repeated measures AN OVA with age as the between participants variable and trial type as the within participants variable. The results of this analysis revealed a highly significant main effect for age, F(4, 35) = 22.369, P < .01. However, there were not ample data points to determine whether or not there would be a significant effect for trial type. A series of post hoc tests (Fishers PLSD) was then employed to indicate where the significant differences emerged with regard to age. All planned comparisons were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, except that between the adults and adolescents (p = .213). These results indicate that across the protocol as a whole all age groups differed significantly from one another, except for the adults and adolescents.
In order to determine whether the high levels of accuracy excluded specific trial-types, accuracy data for participants scoring above 80% on the protocol were grouped according to trial type and tlhe results are presented in Figure 6 . This figure indicates that only very fl3W of the two youngest groups of participants produced accuracy levels of 80% or above on any of the six trial-types, when compared with the three older participant groups. It is important to note that there were a limited number of data points for the current analysis and therefore it is difficult to derive the true performance of participants on the separate trial-types from this study. ---- Figure 6 . Number of participants with accuracy levels of 80% and higher presented by trial type for the five age groups in Experiment 1.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrated a developmental trend in the true/false belief performances on the relational protocol when presented to participants aged from childhood to adulthood. This effect was similar to that recorded in the McHugh et al. (2004) study with regard to relational perspective-taking. One issue that emerged from the results of Experiment 1 concerned the analysis of systematic comparisons between different trial-types (e.g., between true and false belief). This type of analysis might shed some light on the similarities or differences between the relational repertoires involved in responding to the different types of trials. Because there were not enough data points in Experiment 1 to determine any effect for trial type, a number of additional trials were used to extend the length of the protocol in Experiment 2 to generate a larger data set for an analysis of this kind.
EXPERIMENT 2
The first experiment involved a total of 12 true/false belief trial-types, and used just one stimulus set (i.e., doll and cookies). In order to increase the number of trials to which participants were exposed, a number of additional stimulus sets were presented in Experiment 2. In effect, therefore, participants in Experiment 2 had a greater number of exposures to the same trial-types presented in Experiment 1 via additional stimulus sets.
Method
Participants
From five age ranges, 40 naive participants (i.e., 8 in each age group) were in Experiment 2. The age ranges were identical to those involved in the previous experiment and participants were recruited in the same way. Once again, no participants received any remuneration for their involvement in the experiment.
Setting and Apparatus
The setting used in Experiment 2 was identical to that employed in Experiment 1. The protocol employed in both studies was identical, except that more trials were presented in the second study relative to the first. Specifically, the protocol presented in Experiment 1 consisted of 12 trials, whereas this number was increased to 60 trials for Experiment 2 (the latter protocol is hereafter referred to as the extended protocol). Only one stimulus set (i.e., cookies and a doll) was employed in the first protocol and an additional four stimulus sets were incorporated into the extended protocol (see Table 2 for the stimulus sets employed). 
Stimulus Set
1 (original) 2 3 4 5
General Procedure
The extended protocol employed in Experiment 2 was presented to all participants as a test and no feedback was provided after any response. Some aspects of the general procedure differed across the five age groups. The additional exposures to each trial type in Experiment 2, the extended protocol was too long for younger (i.E!., those aged between 3 and 5 and between 6 and 8 years old) partici ipants to complete in a single session. As a result, a number of modifications were made to the presentation of the extended protocol for use with the two youngest groups of children. As in Experiment 1, each session consisted of one block of 12 test trials. In Experiment 2, therefore, the youngest two groups of participants received a total of five test exposures across five consecutive sessions, with a new stimulus set employed in each session. The order in which the five stimulus sets were presented was randomized across participants. Each of the five sessions lasted between 5 and 7 min, and the total participation time for each of the young participants was therefore approximately 30 min. This modification was not deemed necessary for the three groups of older participants, who were exposed to all 60 trials in a single experimental session that lasted approximately 20 min. Because the stimulus sets were not separated for these pariicipants, all of the trials in the extended protocol were randomized.
Results
The number of correct responses in the extended protocol were analyzed for each participant and then grouped by age category and trial type. The data are presented in Figure 7 . In terms of the number of correct responses ove rall produced by participants across the five age groups, the results for Experiment 2 were almost identical to those obtained in the previous experi ment (see Figure  5 ). That is, participants in the youngest age group (3-5 years) produced the least number of correct responses, while those in the oldest age group (18-30 years) produced the largest number of correct responses. Thus the collective data represent a developmental trend similar to that observed in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the number of correct responses produced by participants between these two age groups appeared to increase as a function of age, as was also the case in the previous experiment.
Level of correct responding was analyzed statistically using a 5 x 6 mixed repeated measures ANOVA, with age as the between-participants variable and trial type as the within-participants variable. This analysis revealed a significant effect for age, F(4, 35) = 40.586 , P < .01 , but not for trial type, F(5, 35) = .864, p= .5064. The interaction between age and trial type was non significant at the .05 level.
A series of post hoc tests (Fishers PLSD) was employed to indicate where the significant differences emerged with regard to age. These analyses revealed significant differences (> 0.05) in correct responding between all age groups, except between the adolescent and late childhood participants (p = 0.5074) . This was the same pattern of results as found in the first experiment.
Once again, in order to determine whether the high levels of accuracy excluded specific types of trials, the data for participants who scored at accuracy levels of 80% and higher were grouped according to trial type. The results are presented in Figure 8 . The figure indicates that none of the youngest group of participants responded at an accuracy level of above 80% and that responding at this level appeared to increase as a function of age . In summary, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 both indicated a developmental trend in the performances of participants aged from childhood to adulthood on the current true/false belief protocol. This trend was supported by significant differences in the number of correct responses between most of the age groups, and the fact that accuracy of responding appeared to increase as a function of age. Limited data points in Experiment 1 did not permit an analysis of the effect of trial type, but the results of Experiment 2, which did permit such an analysis, indicated no such effect. This finding suggests that there may be important overlaps among the repertoires involved in responding to the various trial types contained within the current true/false belief protocol and in responding to true and false belief in particular.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
From a relational frame perspective, undE3rstanding false belief involves complex patterns of derived relational responding in accordance with the deictic relational frames of I-you , here-there, and now-then as well as logical not. Both experiments in the current study showed differences in the relational performances of participants from various age groups between 3 and 30 years old on protocols involving true and false belief tasks in which these frames were emphasized explicitly. The results of both experiments yielded significant between-group differences with regard to age in terms of performance accuracy. Overall, accurate responding increased as a function of age with participants in the older groups performing significantly better than those in the younger groups. The results of both studies indicated no significant effect for trial type, which suggests that there may be important overlaps among the relational repertoires involved in responding to the various trial types employed in the current protocols.
Two key differences emerged between the findings of the two experiments. First, though no significant difference between the adult and adolescent groups was recorded in Experiment 1, a significant difference did emerge in Experiment 2. Second, though a significant difference was recorded between the adolescent and late childhood groups in Experiment 1, no such difference was observed in Experiment 2. Both differences relate to the performances of the adolescent group who produced lower levels of accuracy in Experiment 2. The differences between the two studies might be accounted for by the simple fact that Experiment 2 (60 tasks) contained many more exposures than Experiment 1 (12 tasks) and that the weaknesses of the adolescent group emerged only in the latter. Thus, the adolescent group were no Significantly worse than the adult group, but were significantly better than the late childhood group in Experiment 1, but as their performances deteriorated in Experiment 2 these patterns of differences were altered.
The current study is similar to a number of other recent studies in that it represents a broadening of the RFT research program into an area that has more traditionally been the domain of mainstream psychology; other such studies include for example McHugh et al. (2004) (perspective taking) and Stewart and Barnes-Holmes (2001) (metaphor) . The current work, in particular, stemmed from previous RFT analyses of perspective taking in which McHugh et al. reported a distinctive developmental trend in the emergence of responding in accordance with the three perspectivetaking frames of I-you, here-there, and now-then. The results of the current experiment clearly corroborate the findings of such a developmental trend. However, the findings of the current study also differ in one important respect from those of the previous work on perspective taking. Specifically, McHugh et al. found a significant effect for trial type and suggested that the relational perspective-taking skills targeted by their protocol were functionally distinct operant response classes. The current experiment, however, found no such effect for trial type, suggesting a functional overlap between the relational skills targeted herein. McHugh et al. argued that responding in accordance with the perspective-taking frames may play an important role in Levels 1-3 of understanding informational states, as defined by the literature on Theory of Mind. It could be argued that the current work was primarily concerned with ToM Levels 4 and 5-understanding informational states pertaining to true and false belief. The present finding of no significant effect for trial type suggests that responding to Levels 4 and 5 consists of overlapping repertoires that perhaps rely on similar behavioral processes. It may be the case, for example, that all three perspective-taking frames must be present for accurate responding to true and false belief, and that responding to one frame over another cannot be parsed out at this level of ability. Future research , therefore, might investigate whether training, for example, in responding to true belief would facilitate responding to false belief. The significant differences among the performances of the various age groups observed in the current experiment and in the previous work by McHugh et al. (2004) on perspective taking are largely consistent with the results of more mainstream developmental research. Wimmer and Perner (1983) , for example, reported a sharp increase in the ability of young children to respond to true belief between the ages of approximately 4 and 6 years old. These researchers argued that these findings indicated the development of a novel cognitive skill that is not present before this age. The current findings lend some support to this view, but go somewhat further by providing a functional-analytic account of this cognitive development using the language of RFT. From an RFT perspective, many prerequisite relational skills such as responding to 1-you and responding in accordance with the relational frame of comparison are necessary for the development of responding to true and false belief, but the exact relationship between the development of these various skills is an empirical issue. Further research, therefore, will be needed to address these issues in greater detail.
The developmental trend recorded overall in the performances of the participants in the current experiments and in those reported by McHugh et al. (2004) are also consistent with RFT in su!ggesting that relational skills such as those targeted here are repertoires of operant responses. In short, if understanding true and false beliefs involves deriving arbitrary stimulus relations, and if this type of behavior is operant in nature, then responding to true and false belief should develop over time. The current work clearly suggests this to be the case .
Although the present work was generated by RFT, it is entirely consistent both with both traditional behavioral concepts as well as those from the mainstream developmental literature. The implications of this work, therefore, are of relevance to a range of schools of thought and suggest important areas of overlap among them. Similar to the work on relational perspective-taking, the current studies indicate the expansion of behavioral research into areas that appeared previously to be beyond the grasp of behavior analysis and thereby suggest important avenues for future research.
